RECENT CASES
based their results upon business custom and usage in accordance with the spirit of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie, 135 Ia. 685, iio N.W. 29
(1907); Sublette Exchange v. Fitzgerald, 168 Ill. App. 240 (1912); Gordon v. Levine, I%9
Mass. 418, 8o N.E. 505 (1907). The last case cited, a leading case on the subject, established the rule that deposit for collection within one day after receipt and transmission
for collection through the usual course adopted by that bank should be regarded as due
diligence. The rule of the present case, though not required for the decision, seems to
restrict unnecessarily the more liberal view of the Gordon case.
WiLIAz L. FIAcKs
Bills and Notes-Contract upon a Negotiable Instrument-M'egotiable Instruments Law § i6-[Massachusetts].-Defendant was made the payee of a note,
secured by a mortgage, in order to defraud the creditors of the actual owner of the
note. Defendant then assigned the note and mortgage to the actual owner by a separate instrument under seal without consideration or delivery of the note or mortgage.
The assignment was not in fraud of the defendant's creditors, nor were debts created
in reliance on the apparent ownership of the note. The negotiability of the note did
not dearly appear. Suit was brought to reach the note in payment of certain debts of
defendant. Held, the plaintiff could not recover as the assignment was valid and irrevocable. O'Gasapianv. Danielson, 187 N.E. 107 (Mass. 1933).
This decision represents the prevailing view as to the assignment of non-negotiable
instruments in the jurisdictions where the seal is effective. Connorv. Trawick's Adin'r,
37 Ala. 289 (i861); Newell v. Newell, 34 Miss. 385 (1857); Tarbox v. Grant, 56 N.J.
Eq. 199, 39 Ad. 378 (1898); see also Contracts Restatement (1932), § 157; Williston,
Contracts (1920), § 44o. This effect was given to a seal even in a jurisdiction that has so
far reduced the formalities of a sealed instrument that not even a scroll is required.
Mass. Acts of 1929, c. 377, § 2. See 15 Am. Bar Ass'n Jour. 46o. Where, however, the
rights of an assignee are regarded as merely equitable, Williston, Contracts (1920),
§ 447; but see Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816 (1916) and
30 id. 449 (1917), it would seem that a court of equity would hold an assignment under
seal as revocable in compliance with the maxim that equity will not aid a volunteer,
the seal being a product of the common law courts. Borum v. King's Adm'r, 37 Ala.
6o6 (i861).
While the validity of the assignment of a negotiable instrument is governed by the
common law rather than the law merchant, Bullitt v. Scribner, i Blackf. (Ind.) 14
(188), the negotiability of the instrument may be significant in determining the legal
power retained by the assignor. See Williston, Contracts (1920), §§ 440, 1042. It is
generally recognized that for an assignment to be effective there must be a parting with
all present and future legal power and dominion over what is assigned. McCutchen v.
McCutchen, 9 Port. (Ala.) 650 (1839); Walker v. Crews, 73 Ala. 412 (1882); Calvin v.
Free, 66 Kan. 466, 71 Pac. 823 (1903); 20 Cyc. 1195, 1196. Thus, if the instrument
were negotiable it would seem that the legal power of negotiation would make the purported assignment ineffectual so far as bona fide purchasers from the assignor are
concerned.
The court in the principal case held the Negotiable Instruments Law inapplicable
even if the instrulnent were negotiable, because there was no delivery of the note to the
assignee. But the Negotiable Instruments Law, § 16, Ann. Laws of Mass. (933), c.
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107 § 38, states that, "Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and
revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto." See
Horn v. Nicholas, 139 Tenn. 453, 201 S.W. 756 (1917). It is not certain, however, that
there was no delivery. The Negotiable Instruments Law, § 191, clause 6, provides:
"Delivery means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to
another." Common law cases have held that for a constructive delivery of an instrument there need be no manual transfer or possession. Noble v. Fickes, 230 Ill. 594, 82
N.E. 950 (1907); Kelsa v. Graves, 64 Kan. 777, 68 Pac. 607 (1902); Bome v. Holies, 195
Mass. 495, 8i N.E. 290 (19o7); Ehrlichv. Sklamberg, 65 Misc. 5,139 N.Y.S. 3 3 7 (1909).
An undoubtedly true statement in the principal case would be that the assignee obtains none of the advantages of a "holder" under the Negotiable Instruments Law because he was not an indorsee. Negotiable Instruments Law, § i9, clause 7. In regard
to the rights of a transferee the Negotiable Instruments Law, § 49, provides: "Where
the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing
it, the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the transferor had therein." Because
the words "for value" are in the statute, some courts take the narrow interpretation
that a gratuitous transferee does not have title even as between the maker and the
assignee. Bmd v. Maxwell, 4o Ga. App. 679, 150 S.E. 86o (1929); Moore v. Moore, 35
Ga. App. 39, 131 S.E. 922 (1926), where the assignment was by a separate instrument.
This requirement of value was made even in a state giving a seal the effect of a conclusive presumption of consideration. Code of Georgia, 1926, §§ 4219, 4241. However, section 49 might be extended by analogy to cover a gratuitous transferee.
Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (5th ed. 1932), 472. The term "for value" may
be interpreted as a requisite solely for the continuing clause: "and the transferee
acquires in addition the right to have the indorsement of the transferor." See Elmore v.
Harris,134 Okla. 282, 273 Pac. 892 (1928). Where a transferee is required to give value
to obtain title to a negotiable instrument a mere technical consideration will be
sufficient if value be defined as in the Negotiable Instruments Law, § 25: "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." This definition has been followed
by some courts by disregarding the Negotiable Instruments Law, § i9i, clause 12:
"Value means valuable consideration." Judy v. Steer's Adm'x, i99 Ky. 221, 250 S.W.
859 (1923); Jackson v. Carter, 128 S.C. 79, 121 S.E. 559 (1924); Marling v. Fitzgerald,
138 Wis. 93, i2o N.W. 388 (i909).

AsmLEY FoARD
Conflict of Laws-Determination of Validity of Inter Vivos Trust of Movables[New York].-H and W, domiciled in Quebec, entered into an antenuptial agreement
settling a sum of money on W. Subsequent to their marriage they entered into an
agreement whereby W gave up all rights under the previous settlement, and H conveyed to her an interest in a more valuable trust consisting of securities then in the
possession of a New York trust company, which was named trustee, and other securities turned over to the trustee by the agent of H in New York. Plaintiff, trustee in
bankruptcy of H, the settlor, brought an action against W to have the trust set aside
as void in its inception, on the ground that, by the law of Quebec where husband and
wife agree to maintain separate estates, neither spouse can transfer to the other, directly or in trust, a substantial part of his or her property. Held, two judges dissenting,
that the law of the situs of the trust res and the place in which the parties had intended

